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Abstract. The efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance theory have been the 
cornerstone of modern asset pricing for the past 50 odd years. Although both theories are 
fundamental in explaining modern asset pricing, they are opposing views. The efficient 
market hypothesis dictates that the price of any asset depends on the information, while the 
behavioural finance theory dictates that the price depends on the reaction of the market 
participants to the information. Therein lays the key to the argument influencing modern 
asset pricing, does price immediately reflect the information or market participants’ 
perception of the information. In this paper, we will critical evaluate the theories 
influencing the behavioural finance theory. We will review the overreaction/underreaction 
hypothesis and rational bubbles arguments influencing the behavioural finance theory. In 
concluding, we find that although the behavioural finance theory has difficulties in testing 
and the empirical evidence is mixed. Yet it does explain a number of anomalies in the 
financial world and is a more accurate view of the real world.  It is also possible to explain 
market efficiency using the underreaction/overreaction hypothesis. However, a key 
advantage of using the efficient market hypothesis is that it is a useful benchmark for 
regulators and central bankers alike. The lack of a uniformed testable model means that the 
behavioural finance theory as it stands cannot be used as a benchmark. Conversely, the key 
to the behavioural finance theory is in its ability to explain the movement from the 
benchmark. So in essence, both models are required to explain asset pricing. 
Keywords. Behavioural finance theory, Efficient market hypothesis, Neoclassical 
economics, Overreaction/underreaction hypothesis, Rational bubbles 
JEL. B13, G02, G03, G12, G14. 
 
1. Introduction: Full reserve banking in brief 
n essence, this paper is a study of the theories influencing the asset pricing in 
the global financial market. In order to understand asset pricing, we must 
understand the influencing factors underpinning the two fundamental theories 
of asset pricing: the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance theory. As 
proposed by Malkiel (1962) and Fama (1965), the efficient market hypothesis 
argues that the price of any asset must immediately reflect fundamental 
information about the asset. Whereas the behavioural finance theory, as argued by 
Statman (2008) and Subrahmanyam (2007), states that in order to truly understand 
the movement of asset prices there is a requirement to include the psychology of 
the market participants.  
Essentially, as stated by De Bondt (2000), there are three perspectives on asset 
pricing: “the price is right” view proposed by Malkiel & Fama (1970), the price is 
driven by animal spirit view of Keynes (1936) and any uptrend in an asset price 
must eventually come down resembling Newton’s law of universal gravitation. 
Interestingly the third perspective is the key to understanding the empirical studies 
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of behavioural finance. Some of the issues regarding the pricing of assets cannot be 
addressed without a reference to the behavioural finance theory. A criticism (for 
example De Bondt et al. (2008) and Kourtidis et al. (2011)) often put against the 
neoclassical economics model and in particular, the efficient market hypothesis is 
that market participants are homo-sapiens and not homo economics. Hence, in 
order to address these issues there is a requirement to understand the psychology of 
the market participants. This led to the alternative theory of behavioural finance 
being put forward by Statman (2008) and Subrahmanyam (2007) amongst others. 
A key notion in behavioural finance theory as put by Bernard Baruch is: 
“What is important in market fluctuations are not the events themselves, but 
the human reactions to those events.” (Lee et al., 2002, p. 2277). 
One of these issues is the price deviation from the fundamental value. As the 
comment from Bernard Baruch above hints, the key to understanding this deviation 
is the reaction of the market participants. This lends itself to the overreaction 
hypothesis as suggested by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Hong & 
Stein (1999) and De Bondt (2000). This leads to another issue, the existence of 
bubbles, which causes the asset price to temporary deviate from the fundamental 
value in the short to medium term as illustrated by Kindleberger & Aliber (2005). 
This paper will open with brief overview of the behavioural finance theory. This 
will be followed by an in depth review of the overreaction/underreaction 
hypothesis before continuing on to rational bubbles. The final part is the 
conclusion. 
 
2. The Theory of Behavioural Finance 
In essence, De Bondt et al. (2008) and Kourtidis et al. (2011) argue that there is 
a necessity to understand the psychology of market participants in order to provide 
an explanation of market abnormalities, such as asset price bubbles and crashes, 
and comprehend the efficiency of the financial markets. This would seem to 
suggest it is difficult to fully understand and research the global financial market 
without reference to the behavioural finance theory. In addition, as hinted by 
Kourtidis et al. (2011), the obvious existence of irrational market participants 
making random transactions in the market can only be adequately explained by 
taking account of behavioural factors. As stated by Barberis & Thaler (2003), the 
impact on the price from these irrational market participants can be long-lived and 
substantial. According to Barberis & Thaler (2003), these two issues (i.e. the 
psychology and the long-lived impact of irrational market participants) form the 
building blocks of behavioural finance. 
As stated by Kourtidis et al. (2011), whereas traditionally financial theories 
examine how people behave with respect to wealth maximization, behavioural 
finance is interested in how people “actually” behave in a financial environment. 
Essentially, as defined by De Bondt et al. (2008) and Statman (2008) behavioural 
finance is the psychological study of the market participants and their interaction 
with the financial markets where the market participants may be individual 
households or organizations. As stated by De Bondt et al. (2008) the behavioural 
finance theory is not necessarily based on the assumption of rational market 
participants and efficient markets. An important factor in the behavioural finance 
theory, indicated by Statman (2008), is that market participants are assumed to 
behave normal in the sense that they act rational but with a limited information set. 
As a result, markets are not efficient but hard to beat. The main idea influencing 
the behavioural finance theory is a number of behavioural factors influences 
market participants, to fully understand this reaction of market participants there is 
a need to research these behavioural factors. Kourtidis et al. (2011) state there are 
many behavioural factors highlighted in the literature on behavioural finance that 
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explain the behaviour of market participants in the financial market. However, they 
limit their study to four major behavioural factors in analysing the market 
participants’ behaviour in the financial market: over-confidence, risk tolerance, 
social influence and self-monitoring. 
According to Subrahmanyam (2007) there seems to be evidence to suggest that 
the assumptions and models underpinning the behavioural finance theory are 
plausible. He states there is evidence to suggest that non-risk based factors 
influence the predictions of returns more than risk-based factors. There also seem 
to be evidence to suggest that psychological hypothesises about market 
participants’ biases can be tested in an ex-ante manner. And although the evidence 
seems to be suggesting that markets are inefficient and predictable patterns do 
exist, this does not mean that individual market participants can make large excess 
returns. However, there is evidence that institutional market participants are able to 
take advantage of these predictable patterns in the financial markets. He argues that 
although there is evidence suggesting that irrational agents do influence the market 
in the short run, however there is also strong evidence that irrational agents do 
influence the market in the long run. 
As hinted by Subrahmanyam (2007), there is evidence to suggest that asset 
prices are influenced by a reference price and the disposition effect. This evidence 
seems to be pointing towards the existence of a pattern in the trading activity of 
individual market participants. Moreover, as he hints although there is evidence to 
suggest that market participants seem to be constructing their portfolios from a 
limited number of simple strategies like locality, knowledge and word of mouth. 
However, there seem to be a lack of emphasis in the literature on portfolio choice 
of market participants. Another key factor as stated by Statman (2008) is that the 
hypothesises underpinning the behavioural finance theory, such as the disposition 
hypothesis which predict market participants will realize rapid gains but defer 
losses, are testable. Thus meaning they can be rejected or accepted depending on 
the analysis of the data and have been shown by many empirical studies to be 
capable of accurately predicting market participant’s behaviour. 
 
3. The Overreaction/Underreaction Hypothesis 
A key assumption of the efficient market hypothesis is that current prices 
should fully reflect all information on the asset as hinted by Fama (1965) and 
Malkiel (1962). There is an issue with this statement in that the current price does 
not reflect the information but the sentiment of the market participants with respect 
to the information as suggested by De Bondt (2000) and Daniel et al. (1998) among 
others. Therein lays the key to understanding the overreaction hypothesis (as hinted 
by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Hong & Stein (1999) and De Bondt 
(2000)); since market participants have different perspectives on how to interpret 
the new information, therefore the price could deviate from the fundamental value. 
Essentially, as hinted by De Bondt (2000), the overreaction hypothesis states that 
sometimes market participants tend to disproportionately react to information 
(fundamentals and news) causing a temporarily and dramatic deviation from the 
fundamental value. Usually the price does revert to the fundamental value within a 
short period of time as market participants digest the information. 
In essence, according to De Bondt (2000), most overreactions are due to errors 
in market participants’ forecasts. A common issue is that market participants are 
often upbeat during bull markets and gloomy during bear markets, this is reflected 
in their perspectives of the asset price. Another issue is the problem of 
overestimation of the information on the asset during the issuance or initial public 
offering stage by the agents. According to Barberis et al. (1998), a key factor in the 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 3(3), B. Fakhry, p.458-465. 
461 
overreaction hypothesis is that a sequence of good or bad news can lead to an 
overreaction by market participants assuming the continuation of the trend. Daniel 
et al. (1998) suggest there is a differentiation based on whether the information is 
public or private. Thus meaning market participant are overconfident in their 
private information leading to an overreaction in the market. Whilst in general they 
tend to underreact to public information. Moreover, as discussed in Barberis et al. 
(1998) the evidence seems to be pointing at some market participants’ conservative 
attitude to updating their model incurring the underreaction hypothesis. 
However, as Hong & Stein (1999) highlight it is essential to analyse the 
interaction between heterogeneous market participants. They analyse two types of 
bounded rational market participants: momentum traders and news watchers to 
illustrate the effects on one another. The results seem to be suggesting that when 
news watchers pick up new information, in general they underreact. This is mainly 
due to the gradual diffusing of information and the assumption that they do not 
observe prices. When short run momentum traders enter the market, seeing a 
chance to profit, instead of pushing the price towards the fundamental value, they 
cause an overreaction to any news. While in the short run market participants could 
make a profit, in the long run they make losses due to the price exceeding the long 
run equilibrium price. According to Hong & Stein (1999), the inclusion of well-
informed fully rational arbitrageurs does not eliminate the effects of other less 
informed and rational market participants. Thus meaning the overreaction 
continues to have an impact on the price. 
Recent empirical evidence paints a mixed picture for the overreaction/ 
underreaction hypothesis, in Spyrou et al. (2007) they find a split between large 
and small capitalization stocks in the London Stock Exchange. Large capitalization 
stocks were consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, while medium to small 
stocks seem to underreact to news shocks for many days. This underreaction is 
unexplained by risk factors or any other known effect. 
A relevant factor raised by Fakhry & Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016) 
regarding the efficient market hypothesis is that during some highly volatile 
periods some markets seem to be rejecting the null hypothesis of the market being 
too volatile to be efficient. As hinted by Kirchler (2009), the underreaction/ 
overreaction hypothesis provides one possible explanation, which suggests that 
market participants’ reaction leads to overvaluation or undervaluation during bulls 
or bears market respectively. Hence, a highly volatile period with instances of both 
a bear and bull market would give the impression of an efficient market.  
However, contrary to the two previous articles, Lobe & Rieks (2011) find 
significant evidence of short-term overreaction in the Frankfurt stock exchange is 
not limited to small capitalization stocks. The explanation seems to be in the 
anomalies and stock characteristics. However, transaction costs and unpredictable 
markets mean that market participants may not be able to exploit these effects. This 
means that due to the unforeseeable direction of the reaction and the existence of 
transaction costs prohibiting the implementation of consistent profit making 
strategies, they conclude the evidence seem to be suggesting no violation of the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
 
4. A Review of the Effects of Rational Bubbles 
Essentially, as hinted by Barlevy (2007) the popular notion is bubbles are 
initiated by rapid upwards pressures on the price of a particular type of asset or 
index in a short interval of time, eventually causing downward pressures to correct 
the price or more dangerously a collapse in the price. In simple terms, as hinted by 
Blanchard & Watson (1982), a popular notion defines a bubble as a price deviation 
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from the fundamental value that is apparently unjustified by the information 
available at the time. This was evidence in the technology boom of the late 1990s 
to early 2000s and housing market boom of the early to mid-2000s. As illustrated 
by Kindleberger & Aliber (2005), history is filled with such episodes, the first 
recorded bubble often referred to as the Dutch tulip bubble of the 1630s, the South 
Sea Company bubble of 1719-1720 and the US stock market bubble of the 1920s, 
which ended with the Wall Street crash of 29
th
 October 1929. 
However, as Barlevy (2007) argues this popular definition is ambiguous about 
the scale and length of time of a bubble. At the heart of this argument is the fact 
large price swings could occur under normal market conditions due to shifts in 
supply and demand. An example is an asset with cyclical changes in demand, 
therefore causing dramatic price changes. These price changes are sometimes 
known as fads. In essence, as Barlevy (2007) states many economists define a 
bubble as a rapid upwards deviation from the fundamental value. 
As noted by Blanchard & Watson (1982), therein lays the difference between 
economists and market participants. Economists believe that any deviation from 
the fundamental value is evidence of irrational behaviour whereas market 
participants believe extraneous events could influence the price of any asset or 
index. In other words, “crowd psychology” is an important element in the 
behaviour of asset pricing as pointed by Blanchard & Watson (1982). And as 
Brunnermeier (2001) highlights, there is empirical evidence provided by Shiller 
(1979) among others of excess volatility in asset prices meaning prices deviate 
from their fundamental value more than predicted by the efficient market 
hypothesis. This evidence would suggest there could be rational deviation from the 
fundamental value i.e. rational bubbles. Rational bubbles appear in asset prices 
“If market participants are willing to pay more for the stock than they know 
is justified by the value of the discounted dividend stream because they 
expect to be able to sell it at an even higher price in the future, making the 
current high price an equilibrium price” as defined by Gurkaynak (2008, p. 
166). 
Furthermore, as Blanchard & Watson (1982) point rational behaviour and 
expectation does not imply that prices must follow fundamental values. Of course, 
there is some evidence of irrational behaviour in the market that could cause 
irrational bubbles for a survey of this type of asset price bubbles see Vissing-
Jorgensen (2004). 
As stated by Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003), the efficient market hypothesis 
implies that bubbles do not exist by virtue of the existence of rational well 
informed and financed arbitrageurs guaranteeing that any potential mispricing will 
be corrected (Fama, 1965). However, as Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003) argue some 
rational arbitrageurs also like to take advantage of the bubble to further their 
earnings while the bubble last, hence ideally leaving the market just before the 
crash. Nevertheless, since each rational arbitrageur have their own model and 
assumption of when to leave this leads to asymmetrical information and different 
viewpoints. The key argument against the assumption of the existence of rational 
and financed arbitrageurs is this incoordination between the very agents that will 
supposedly correct any mispricing in the assets. Moreover, as Abreu & 
Brunnermeier (2003) illustrate many supposedly rational agents have lost out on 
huge profits or made huge losses by mistiming their exit. As exemplified by the 
different cases of Julian Robert, Tiger Hedge Fund, and Stanley Druckenmiller, 
Quantum Fund, during the tech bubble of the late 1990s early 2000s see Abreu & 
Brunnermeier (2003, p. 175). 
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5. Conclusion 
In concluding, it is hard to explain the recent financial and to a certain extent 
sovereign debt crises without referring to the behavioural finance theory. In 
essence, the psychology of humans dictates that under normal conditions each 
market participant would interpret the given information about a financial asset 
differently. The nature of financial crises is such that information becomes 
increasingly asymmetrical and news has a greater impact than fundamentals. 
Hence, as illustrated throughout this section, there is ample evidence suggesting 
that financial markets are governed by the reaction of market participants to events 
such as De Bondt et al. (2008), Kourtidis et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2002). 
Another factor highlighted by Bernanke (2010) and Barberis (2011) is the 
possibility of increases in asset prices beyond the fundamental value dictated by the 
information over a period. These two factors point to the existence of asset price 
bubbles and overreaction hypothesis influencing the behaviour of prices and hence 
volatility. 
As illustrated earlier, evidence in the financial markets suggest a mixed picture 
for the overreaction hypothesis see Spyrou et al. (2007), Kirchler (2009), Lobe & 
Rieks (2011) and recently Fakhry & Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016). On 
the other hand, the evidence seems to suggest that market participants do react to 
certain extreme events such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Lehman 
Brothers Bankruptcy and the Japanese tsunami of 2011. This seem to be explained 
by Knightian Uncertainty which dictates under certain market conditions market 
participants are faced with immeasurable systemic risks which lead to market 
participants overreacting as hinted by Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2008). In 
essence, this evidence seems to be suggesting that it is news and not fundamentals 
influencing the financial markets during any financial crisis. In addition, the 
overreaction/underreaction hypothesis may provide a part of the explanation for the 
asset price bubbles. 
There is ample evidence throughout history of asset price bubbles, yet a 
fundamental weakness of the efficient market hypothesis is its assumption that 
bubbles cannot exist due to the existence of rational well-informed and financed 
arbitrageurs see (Fama, 1965). However, as illustrated earlier in this section, there 
is a hint of catch 22 for these arbitrageurs that lead to huge losses or miss-
opportunities see (Abreu & Brunnermeier, 2003). This highlights the difficulties of 
planning strategies during episodes of asset price bubbles, since it is very difficult 
to know when an asset price bubble will burst. The problem is complicated by the 
existence of mixed evidence in the detecting of asset price bubbles see (Gurkaynak, 
2008).  
In concluding, behavioural finance is an essential theory in the explanation of 
the behaviour of asset prices. This is highlighted by the existence of homo-sapiens 
in the global financial market as the decision makers. In essence, neoclassical 
economics and the efficient market hypothesis do not explain certain types of 
behaviours in the financial market such as asset price bubbles and market 
participants’ reactions to news or information. However, the mixed empirical 
evidence, especially in the case of testing for asset price bubbles and to a lesser 
extent the overreaction/underreaction hypothesis, seem to be pointing towards a 
lack of econometrical tests and understanding of how market participants react to 
certain events and information. 
In concluding, the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance theory 
explain different parts of asset pricing. However, as things stand at present, both 
have strong weaknesses. This means in order to understand the pricing of assets 
there is still a requirement to use both fundamental theories. Coincidentally, the 
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behavioural finance theory could be extended to explain the efficient market 
hypothesis by using the overreaction/underreaction steady state and the key is that 
this is testable. So in essence the behavioural finance theory is a more complete 
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